Whenever there are clear differences between the three partners, they are usually linked to resounding failures. In 2003, France refused to side with the U.S.-led coalition that invaded Iraq. It soon became clear that the invasion was ill-advised and that its consequences were poorly planned and executed. The intervention fuelled Iraq`s sectarian division and destabilized the Iraqi state, eroding the main wall of Iran`s expansionist regional policy. A decade after the invasion of Iraq, the Syrian regime`s use of chemical weapons led the P3 to initial agreement on coordinated military strikes. Beyond the chemical weapons themselves, part of the calculation of the P3 was that the strikes could be a back-and-forth in a civil war that had deteriorated so much that its destabilizing effects would be uncontrollable for Syria`s neighbours and for Europe. Unfortunately, the P3 coalition collapsed after the British continued to give up and the second American impression continued. On May 25, 1950, the P3 – the United States, the United Kingdom and France – issued a joint statement on the Arab States and Israel. In the so-called tripartite statement, the three countries declared their “invariable opposition to the use of force or the threat of force between one of the States” in the Middle East, as well as their determination to “take immediate action, both inside and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violations.” Beyond this political commitment made in response to the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the declaration also sought to better coordinate arms sales to Israel and the Arab States. This led to the creation of an Arms Coordination Committee in the Middle East (NEACC) in which representatives of the three Western powers compared notes on arms applications in the Middle East.
The 1950 tripartite declaration, also known as the 1950 tripartite agreement, was a joint declaration by the United States, the United Kingdom and France to ensure the territorial status quo established by the 1949 Arab-Israeli ceasefire agreements. The declaration also called for close consultation between the three powers to limit the Arab-Israeli arms race; it was published on May 25, 1950.  According to Gerald M. Steinberg, the agreement did not prevent Arab states from obtaining weapons through their alliances with suppliers, but Israel was excluded…. The United States provided little foreign aid, and the Israeli military, which wanted to buy weapons and ammunition from the United States, was rejected.  In the 1950s, Britain took a complex position because of its commitment to protect Jordan from aggression under the 1948 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. While coordinating its policy with that of the United States, Britain maintained its military presence in Jordan. The creation of weapons in the Middle East has been associated with a state of high tension between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries. The 1950 tripartite declaration ultimately failed because its stated objective of regional stability was at odds with the reality of its function of regulating competing interests among its participants. But today, the interests of the three countries are probably much more coordinated than they were then. In many ways, the original spirit of the tripartite declaration is perhaps more relevant than ever. The British government officially recognized the State of Israel in 1950 and Britain, France and the United States reached a tripartite agreement to promote peace in the Middle East. Britain supported the West Bank`s union with Jordan.